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Abstract
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation
of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct pref-
erences. Focusing on a standard formulation of cake cutting, in which each agent must receive a
contiguous piece of the cake, this work establishes algorithmic and hardness results for multiple fair-
ness/efficiency measures.
First, we consider the well-studied notion of envy-freeness and develop an efficient algorithm that
finds a cake division (with connected pieces) wherein the envy is multiplicatively within a factor of
3+o(1). The same algorithm in fact achieves an approximation ratio of 3+o(1) for the problem of find-
ing cake divisions with as large a Nash social welfare (NSW) as possible. NSW is another standard
measure of fairness and this work also establishes a connection between envy-freeness and NSW: ap-
proximately envy-free cake divisions (with connected pieces) always have near-optimal Nash social
welfare. Furthermore, we develop an approximation algorithm for maximizing the ρ-mean welfare–
this unifying objective, with different values of ρ, interpolates between notions of fairness (NSW) and
efficiency (average social welfare). Finally, we complement these algorithmic results by proving that
maximizing NSW (and, in general, the ρ-mean welfare) is APX-hard in the cake-division context.
1 Introduction
Cake cutting is a fundamental problem in the fair-division literature. It models the task of allocating a di-
visible, heterogeneous resource among agents with distinct preferences, but equal entitlements. Indeed,
the classic work of Steinhaus, Banach, and Knaster [Ste48]—which lays the mathematical foundations
of fair division—addresses cake cutting. Over the years, this problem has not only inspired the devel-
opment of many interesting mathematical connections and algorithms (see, e.g., [RW98]), but has also
been found relevant in real-world settings, such as border negotiations and divorce settlements [BT96].
Implementations of cake-division methods on platforms (such as Adjusted Winner [Adj]) further sub-
stantiate the practical relevance of this framework.
Here, the cake is represented by the segment [0, 1] and the cardinal preferences of the agents are
specified via valuation functions over (the intervals of) the cake. We will throughout focus on the set-
ting wherein the cake needs to be partitioned into exactly n connected pieces (intervals) and each of
the n agents receives one of these intervals. This is a well-studied formulation of cake cutting and is
motivated by applications wherein connectivity (across each allocated part of the resource) is a cru-
cial requirement [BT96]; consider, e.g., land division, spectrum allocation, and non-preemptive interval
scheduling.1
Achieving fairness and efficiency are two pivotal goals in this resource-allocation context [BT96;
RW98]. The current work contributes to these objectives, with a focus on computational aspects of cake
cutting. The fairness and efficiency objectives addressed in this work are detailed next.
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1The other variant of the problem, wherein agents can receive disconnected pieces, has also been studied in prior work; see,
e.g., [Pro15] and references therein. Related results on this variant are discussed at the end of this section.
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A quintessential notion of fairness is envy-freeness: a division is said to be envy-free iff, under
it, every agent prefers its own piece over that of any other agent [Fol67]. The well-known result of
Su [Su99] (see also [Str80] and [Sim80]) shows that, under mild assumptions on agents’ valuations, envy-
free cake divisions with connected pieces always exist. However, this existential result stands without
an algorithmic counterpart; Stromquist [Str08] has shown that such an envy-free solution cannot be
computed in bounded time, if the valuations are specified by an adaptive adversary.2 This negative
result leads one to study relaxations/approximation guarantees, such as the ones considered in this
work.
It is relevant to note that, while envy-freeness provides fairness guarantees on an individual level,
in and of itself, this notion is not concerned with overall efficiency. By contrast, the concept of social
welfare quantifies efficiency achieved by the agents as a whole. Social (utilitarian) welfare is defined as
the sum of the values that the agents have for their own pieces. For this welfare objective, we establish
(multiplicative) approximation guarantees in the cake-cutting setup.3
A balance between the utilitarian (Benthamite) objective and the egalitarian (Rawlsian/max-min)
welfare is achieved through Nash social welfare (NSW), which is defined as the geometric mean of the
agents’ values [NJ50; KN79]. This welfare function has traditionally been studied for homogeneous
(divisible) goods, where it is known to possess strong fairness (envy-freeness) and (Pareto) efficiency
properties [Var73]. The appeal of Nash social welfare continues to hold in the case of indivisible goods:
Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16] have shown that (under additive valuations) Nash-optimal allocations
of discrete goods satisfy a natural relaxation of envy-freeness and are Pareto efficient. The relevance
of Nash social welfare, as a measure of fairness, motivates its study in the cake-cutting setup as well.
Towards this end, this work develops algorithmic and hardness results for the problem of finding cake
divisions that maximize Nash social welfare.
Generalized (Ho¨lder) means provide a unified framework to address fairness and efficiency objec-
tives. Specifically, with exponent parameter ρ, the ρ-mean welfare, Mρ(·), is defined as
(
1
n
∑
i v
ρ
i
)1/ρ;
here vis denote the valuations obtained by the agents in an allocation. We address ρ-mean welfare for
ρ ∈ (0, 1]. In particular, this parameter range captures both Nash social welfare and social welfare: ρ = 1
gives us the arithmetic mean (average social welfare) and, as ρ tends to zero, the limit of Mρ is equal to
the geometric mean (the Nash social welfare).4
This paper addresses all of the above-mentioned notions of fairness and efficiency. In particular,
we develop approximation algorithms for finding cake divisions, with connected pieces, under the fol-
lowing objectives: (i) multiplicatively bounding envy, (ii) maximizing Nash social welfare, and (iii)
maximizing ρ-mean welfare, for ρ ∈ (0, 1]. We complement these approximation guarantees by estab-
lishing hardness results for Nash social welfare and ρ-mean welfare maximization. Our contributions
are summarized in the following list.
• Envy-Freeness: We develop an efficient algorithm that finds a cake division (i.e., a partition of the cake
into n connected pieces along with a one-to-one assignment of these pieces among the n agents) such
that for every agent a the value of its piece is at least 1/(3 + o(1)) times a’s value for any other agent’s
piece (Theorem 2). Our algorithm for finding an approximately envy-free allocation is rather direct
(see Section 3 for a description). The explainablity/simplicity of this algorithm is a notable feature,
since it makes the developed method amenable for realistic implementations, such as the ones found
on websites like Spliddit [GP14].
• Nash Social Welfare: Our algorithm for finding approximately envy-free divisions also provides a
2Notably, for the complementary problem of finding envy-free solutions with noncontiguous pieces, the work of Aziz and
Mckinzie [AM16] provides a hyper-exponential time algorithm.
3Here, without loss of generality and to connect social welfare with the other objectives studied in this work, we equate
social welfare with the average (arithmetic mean) of the values obtained by the agents.
4Note that, for each ρ, the ρ-mean welfare is ordinally equivalent to CES (constant elasticity of substitution) welfare func-
tions that have the form
(∑
i v
ρ
i
)1/ρ.
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polynomial-time (3 + o(1))-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization prob-
lem (Theorem 3).
We further show that approximately envy-free cake divisions (with connected pieces) always have
near-optimal Nash social welfare: if in a cake division the envy is (multiplicatively) bounded within a
factor of α, then the Nash social welfare of the division is at least 12α times the optimal (Theorem 4).
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Connections between envy-freeness and Nash social welfare have been established in other fair-division
settings: addressing fair allocation of homogeneous,6 divisible goods under additive valuations, the
work of Varian [Var73] shows that there always exists an allocation which is both envy-free and Nash
optimal.7 Also, Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16] have established that, when dividing indivisible goods,
allocations that maximize Nash social welfare satisfy relaxations of envy-freeness. Our result (Theo-
rem 4) shows that analogous connections hold in the cake-division framework as well.
We complement the algorithmic result for Nash social welfare by showing that it is APX-hard to find
a Nash optimal cake division with connected pieces (Theorem 7). This hardness result implies, in
particular, that the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare does not admit a polynomial-time ap-
proximation scheme (PTAS), unless P = NP.
• Generalized-Mean Welfare: As mentioned previously, generalized means—Mρ(·) with exponent pa-
rameter ρ ∈ (0, 1]—is a family of functions which captures both Nash social welfare and (average)
social welfare. For this unified objective, we develop a (2 + o(1))1/ρ-approximation algorithm that runs
in time nO(1/ρ); here n is the number of agents (Theorem 6). Hence, for average social welfare (i.e.,
the ρ = 1 case) we obtain a polynomial-time (2 + o(1))-approximation algorithm. We note that this
instantiation improves upon the 8-approximation guarantee obtained specifically for social welfare in
the work of Aumann et al. [ADH13].
Our algorithm, for maximizing ρ-mean welfare, relies on “discretizing” the given cake-division in-
stance to obtain an interval-scheduling problem, called the Job Interval Selection Problem (JISP). Then,
we invoke the 2-approximation algorithm of Bar-Noy et al. [BNGNS01] for JISP to obtain the stated
approximation guarantee (Lemma 5 and Theorem 6).
We also establish that, for any fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1], finding cake divisions that maximize ρ-mean welfare is
APX-hard. This general result, though, holds for cake-division instances wherein the valuations are
not necessarily normalized.8 For the social welfare case (i.e., the ρ = 1 setting), our techniques can be
adopted to establish APX-hardness even under normalized valuations. Hence, we can rule out a PTAS
for the social welfare maximization problem. This strengthens the inapproximability result of Aumann
et al. [ADH13], which showed that efficient (in the social-welfare sense) cake cutting does not admit a
fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
Prior work has also studied the impact of envy-freeness on social welfare in the cake-cutting context.
Specifically, Caragiannis et al. [CKKK09] along with Aumann and Dombb [AD10] establish bounds for
price of envy-freeness, which is defined as the ratio between the social welfare of an optimal allocation
and the social welfare of the best envy-free allocation. We extend this framework to ρ-mean welfare
and show that any (approximately) envy-free allocation provides an O(2 1ρ n ρρ+1 )-approximate solution
to maximizing ρ-mean welfare, for ρ ∈ (0, 1] (Theorem 8 in Section 6). We note that our upper bound
on the price of envy-freeness for the ρ = 1 instantiation (i.e., for social welfare) is essentially tight. This
5In comparison to this generic connection between envy-freeness and Nash social welfare, the cake divisions computed
specifically by our algorithm admit a stronger guarantee–they essentially achieve an approximation bound of three for both
envy and Nash social welfare.
6Hence, such goods do not correspond to a heterogenous cake.
7In fact, in the homogenous-goods case, such an allocation can be efficiently computed by solving the convex program of
Eisenberg and Gale [EG59]. By contrast, finding a Nash optimal allocation is the cake-division setting is computationally hard.
8Agents’ valuations are said to be normalized iff, for every agent, the value of the entire cake is equal to one.
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follows from considering the result of Aumann and Dombb [AD10], which establishes a Θ(
√
n) bound
on the price of envy-freeness, in the social-welfare context.
Additional Related Work Another standard notion of fairness is proportionality. This criterion requires
that every agent a receives a piece of value at least 1/n times a’s value for the entire cake; here n is the
total number of agents participating in the cake-cutting exercise. In contrast to envy-freeness, propor-
tionality is an algorithmically tractable solution concept; see [Pro15] and references therein. Though,
given that an (approximately) envy-free allocation is also (approximately) proportional,9 approxima-
tion guarantees for envy-freeness (such as the ones developed in this work) give us matching bounds
for proportionality as well.
With respect to maximizing social welfare, the result closest to ours is that of Aumann et al. [ADH13].
We reiterate that the current work improves upon the algorithmic and hardness bounds obtained in [ADH13].
Bei et al. [BCH+12] develop approximation results for maximizing social welfare with proportionality
as a constraint. By contrast, we focus on social welfare by itself.
Deng et al. [DQS12] present an algorithm that finds an additive approximation to an envy-free cake
division with connected pieces. This algorithm, however, runs in exponential (in the number of agents)
time.
If disconnected pieces can be assigned to each agent, then an additive approximation to envy-free
divisions can be computed efficiently, see, e.g., [LMMS04] and the reentrant version of the last dimin-
isher protocol in [BT96]. Also, for the disconnected-pieces variant and under specific valuations types,
Aziz and Ye [AY14] present an efficient algorithm for maximizing Nash social welfare. The results of
Kurokawa et al. [KLP13] and Cohler et al. [CLPP11] address the noncontiguous-pieces setup as well.
In particular, for a class of valuations, Cohler et al. [CLPP11] develop an algorithm for maximizing so-
cial welfare subject to the envy-freeness constraint. Our results are incomparable with all of these prior
works, since we solely focus on allocation of connected pieces.
A relaxation of envy-free division entails free disposal. The idea here is to achieve envy-freeness at
the cost of discarding some parts of the cake. Aziz and Mackenzie [AM16] (see also [SHHA15]) develop
an exponential-time algorithm that finds envy-free divisions, wherein each agent a receives a connected
piece of value at least 12n times a’s value for the entire cake. Here, the proximity to the proportional
share is used to quantify the loss incurred due to the disposal. Our cake-cutting algorithm (ALG in
Section 3) can be used to efficiently find, with disposal, an additively-approximate envy-free division,
wherein each agent receives a connected piece of value
(
1
2n − o(1)
)
times its value for the cake.10 We note
that such a division is obtained as an intermediate solution in our algorithm; at the end, the algorithm
allocates the entire cake.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We consider the problem of dividing a cake (which metaphorically represents a divisible, heterogenous
good) among n agents. In this setup, the cake is modeled as the segment [0, 1] and the (possibly) distinct
cardinal preferences of the agents are expressed as valuation functions, {va}a∈[n], over the intervals
contained in [0, 1] (i.e., over the pieces of the cake). Specifically, for each agent a ∈ [n] and interval
I = [x, y] ⊂ [0, 1], with 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1, the function va maps I to agent a’s value for it, va(I) ∈ R+.
Conforming to standard assumptions, this work addresses valuations {va}a∈[n] that are (i) nonneg-
ative, (ii) normalized: the value of the entire cake is equal to one, va([0, 1]) = 1, (iii) divisible: for
every interval I = [x, y] and parameter λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a z ∈ [x, y] with the property that
va([x, z]) = λva([x, y]), and (iv) sigma additive: va(I ∪ J) = va(I) + va(J), for all disjoint intervals
I, J ⊂ [0, 1].
9We conform to the standard assumption that the valuations of the agents over the cake are sigma additive.
10This observation is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
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This divisibility property ensures that the valuations are non-atomic, i.e., va([x, x]) = 0 for all a ∈ [n]
and x ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, this property allows us, as a convention, to regard two intervals to be
disjoint even if they intersect exactly at an endpoint.
Our results hold as long as the valuations satisfy the above-mentioned properties and only require
oracle access to the valuations. That is, our algorithms can be efficiently executed in the Robertson-Webb
model [RW98], which supports oracle access to the valuations in the form of evaluation queries (which,
given an agent a and an interval I , return va(I)) and cut queries (which, given an agent a, an initial point
x ∈ [0, 1], and value τ , return the leftmost point y ∈ [x, 1] such that va([x, y]) = τ ).
However, for ease of presentation, instead of the Robertson-Webb model, we will restrict attention
to a well-studied setting in which the valuations of the agents can be explicitly given as input. In par-
ticular, we will consider valuations that are induced by density functions: given a piecewise-constant
density function νa : [0, 1] 7→ R+ for an agent a ∈ [n], the valuation of any interval I is set to be
va(I) :=
∫
Iνa(x) dx. Valuations obtained by integrating piecewise-constant densities are said to be
piecewise-constant. Indeed, such valuations can be given as input, say, in terms of the underlying density
functions.
Problem Instances: A cake-division instance, with piecewise-constant valuations, is a tuple 〈[n], {va}a∈[n]〉
where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of n agents and vas specify the piecewise-constant valuations
of the agents over the cake [0, 1].
Allocations: As mentioned above, the goal here is to partition the cake into disjoint intervals and allocate
them among the n agents. We will focus solely on assigning to each agent a single interval, i.e., we will
require that the piece assigned to each agent is connected.
For a cake-division instance with n agents, an allocation is defined to be a collection of n pairwise-
disjoint intervals, I = {I1, I2, . . . , In}, where interval Ia is assigned to agent a ∈ [n] and ∪a∈[n] Ia =
[0, 1].11 We will use the term partial allocation to refer to collection of pairwise-disjoint intervals, J =
{J1, J2, . . . , Jn}, that do not necessarily cover the entire cake, ∪aJa ( [0, 1].
The overarching objective of the current work is to find fair and efficient allocations. Relevant no-
tions of fairness and efficiency are defined next.
Envy-Freeness: For a cake-division instance 〈[n], {va}a∈[n]〉, an (partial) allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is
said to be envy free (EF) iff each agent prefers its own interval over that of any other agent, va(Ia) ≥ va(Ib)
for all agents a, b ∈ [n].
We will address a natural relaxation of envy-freeness; specifically, we study allocations in which the
envy between the agents is multiplicatively bounded. Given α ≥ 1, an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is said
to be α-approximately envy free (α-EF) iff va(Ia) ≥ 1α va(Ib), for every pair of agents a, b ∈ [n].
A 1-EF allocation is envy free and, the smaller the value of α, the stronger is the envy-freeness guar-
antee.12
Nash Social Welfare: For an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}, the Nash social welfare is defined to be the ge-
ometric mean of the agents’ valuations, NSW(I) := (∏na=1 va(Ia))1/n. In a cake-division instance, an
allocation I∗ is said to be a Nash optimal allocation iff I∗ ∈ arg maxI∈I NSW(I); here I denotes the set of
all allocations.
Social Welfare and Generalized Mean: Social welfare is a standard measure of efficiency in the context
of resource allocation. For an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}, we define social welfare to be the arithmetic
11Note that the intervals are not indexed based on how their endpoints are ordered, rather the subscript of each interval in
an allocation identifies the unique agent that owns this interval.
12Also, note that α cannot be strictly less than one–the definition of an α-EF allocation requires va(Ia) ≥ 1α va(Ib), even for
b = a.
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mean13 of the valuations, SW(I) := 1n
∑n
a=1 va(Ia).
Generalized (Ho¨lder) means, Mρ, provide a family of functions which interpolate between fairness
and efficiency objectives. The ρ-mean welfare of an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is defined as
Mρ(I) :=
(
1
n
n∑
a=1
[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
We will develop algorithmic and hardness results for maximizing the ρ-mean welfare, with exponent
ρ ∈ (0, 1]. This parameter range, in particular, captures both NSW and SW: ρ = 1 gives us the arithmetic
mean (social welfare) and, as ρ tends to zero, the limit of Mρ is equal to the geometric mean (the Nash
social welfare).
Overall, this paper is concerned with finding allocations (i.e., finding cake divisions with connected
pieces) under the following objectives (i) bounding envy, (ii) maximizing Nash social welfare, and (iii)
maximizing ρ-mean welfare, for ρ ∈ (0, 1].
3 Finding Envy-Free and Nash Optimal Allocations
In this section, first we will develop an efficient algorithm for finding (3 + o(1))-EF allocations and,
in tandem, obtain a polynomial-time (3 + o(1))-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare
maximization problem. Subsequently, we will establish a generic connection between envy-freeness
and Nash social welfare in the cake-cutting context: any α-approximately envy-free allocation provides
a 2α-approximation to Nash social welfare.
Our algorithm, ALG, for finding approximately envy-free allocations starts by assigning an empty
interval to each agent–it starts with the partial allocation consisting of empty sets. Then, the algorithm
proceeds to assign successively higher valued pieces to the agents, i.e., it iteratively moves from one
partial allocation to the next. Note that the initial partial allocation (consisting of empty intervals) is
envy free. In fact, all the partial allocations, P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, computed during ALG’s execution,
satisfy the following additive relaxation of envy-freeness, for a fixed constant ε ∈ (0, 1/3]:
va(Pa) ≥ va(Pb)− ε
n2
for all a, b ∈ [n] (1)
ALG updates a partial allocation P = {P1, . . . , Pn} by considering the unassigned pieces of the cake.
Specifically, given a partial allocationP , write UP = {U1, U2, . . . , Um} to denote the minimum-cardinality
collection of disjoint intervals that satisfy ∪iUi = [0, 1]\∪aPa. In other words, UP consists of the intervals
that remain after the assigned intervals in P (i.e., Pas) are removed from [0, 1]. Since there are n intervals
in P , there can be at most n+ 1 intervals in UP .
ALG keeps iterating as long as there exists an unassigned interval Û ∈ UP of high enough value for
any agent. Then, part of Û is assigned to a judiciously-chosen agent â who relinquishes the previous
interval assigned to it, but now accrues a higher valuation. The criterion for selecting â ensures that
the above-mentioned invariant is maintained; this selection can be viewed as a moving-knife procedure
applied within Û (see Figure 1).
ˆ` rˆrâ ra rb
Pâ
Û = [ˆ`, rˆ]
Figure 1: An illustration of Step 4 in ALG
13Since the work develops multiplicative approximation guarantees, we can consider the average valuation, instead of the
sum of valuations, as a utilitarian objective.
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At the end, when the values of the unassigned intervals are not much larger than the value of the
assigned ones, ALG merges each unassigned interval in UP with an adjacent interval in the (final) partial
allocation P to obtain an approximately envy-free allocation (see Figure 2). The algorithm is detailed
below and we prove in Theorem 2 that it efficiently finds a (3 + o(1))-EF allocation.
Algorithm 1 ALG
Input: A cake-division instance 〈[n], {va}a〉with piecewise-constant valuations and a fixed constant ε ∈ (0, 1/3].
Output: A
(
3 + 9εn
)
-approximately envy-free allocation.
1: Initialize partial allocation P = {P1, . . . , Pn} with empty intervals, i.e., Pa = ∅ for all a ∈ [n]. {Recall that UP
denotes the set of unassigned intervals induced by any partial allocation P .}
2: while there exists an agent a ∈ [n] and an unassigned interval Û = [ˆ`, rˆ] ∈ UP such that va(Pa) < va(Û) − εn2
do
3: Let C :=
{
b ∈ [n] : vb(Pb) < vb(Û)− εn2
}
and, for every agent b ∈ C, set rb ∈ [ˆ`, rˆ] to be the leftmost point
such that vb([ˆ`, rb]) = vb(Pb) + εn2 .
4: Select agent â ∈ arg minb∈C rb.
5: Update the partial allocation P by assigning Pâ ← [ˆ`, râ] and keeping the interval assignment of all other
agents unchanged.
6: Update UP to be the set of unassigned intervals induced by the current partial allocation P .
7: end while
8: Associate each unassigned interval U ∈ UP with an assigned interval Pa ∈ P which is adjacent (either on the
left or on the right) to U .
{Note that any Pa ∈ P gets associated with at most two unassigned intervals, say U and U ′, and U ∪ Pa ∪ U ′
is itself an interval}
9: For all a ∈ [n], let interval Ia be the union of Pa and the unassigned intervals (if any) associated with it.
10: return allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}
PaU1 U2 Pb U3
{ Ia { Ib
Figure 2: An illustration of Steps 8 and 9 in ALG
The following lemma shows that the final partial allocation considered by ALG (in Step 8) satisfies
the additive relaxation of envy-freeness considered in the equation (1), not only between the assigned
intervals, but also against the unassigned ones.
Lemma 1. For a given a cake-division instance
〈
[n], {va}a∈[n]
〉
, with piecewise-constant valuations, and given
parameter ε ∈ (0, 1], let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the final partial allocation considered by ALG (i.e., P is the partial
allocation with which the while-loop terminates) and let UP be the set of unassigned intervals induced by P . Then,
for each agent a ∈ [n] we have
va(Pa) ≥ va(Q)− ε
n2
for all Q ∈ P ∪ UP (2)
Proof First, we observe that the collection of intervals P = {P1, . . . , Pn} considered in any iteration of
ALG is indeed a partial allocation, i.e., the intervals Pas are pairwise disjoint. This simply follows from
the fact that whenever an agent â is assigned a new interval Pâ, it is contained in the unassigned part of
the cake, i.e., Pâ continues to not intersect with the intervals assigned to other agents.
Now, we will show, via an inductive argument, that the partial allocations P = {P1, . . . , Pn} com-
puted by ALG satisfy the above-mentioned invariant (1). The initial (empty) partial allocation is envy
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free and, hence, trivially satisfies this additive relaxation of envy freeness. In an iteration, only the in-
terval assigned to the selected agent â gets updated. Since â’s valuation increases (by ε
n2
), equation (1)
continues to hold for â, i.e., vâ(Pâ) ≥ vâ(Pb) − εn2 for all b ∈ [n]. Also, for all agents a, b ∈ [n] \ {â}, the
assigned intervals remain unchanged, i.e., equation (1) is satisfied for these agents.
It only remains to verify that va(Pa) ≥ va(Pâ) − εn2 for all a ∈ [n]. For agents a 6∈ C (see Step 3 for
the definition of C), we have va(Pa) ≥ va(Û)− εn2 ≥ va([ˆ`, râ])− εn2 ; the last inequality follows from the
containment [ˆ`, râ] ⊆ Û . Since Pâ is set to be [ˆ`, râ], the desired inequality holds for all a 6∈ C. For the
remaining agents a ∈ C, the selection criterion applied in Step 4 gives us this inequality. Indeed, râ ≤ ra
for all a ∈ C. Hence, for agents a ∈ C, we have va(Pa) = va([ˆ`, ra])− εn2 ≥ va([ˆ`, râ])− εn2 = va(Pâ)− εn2 .
Therefore, invariant (1) holds, in particular, for the partial allocation P obtained at the termination of
the while-loop. Also, the fact that the while-loop terminates with P as the final partial allocation implies
that, for all a ∈ [n] and all U ∈ UP , we have va(Pa) ≥ va(U)− εn2 . That is, for each a ∈ [n], the final partial
allocation P = {P1, . . . , Pn} satisfies the stated inequalities: va(Pa) ≥ va(Q)− εn2 for all Q ∈ P ∪ UP .
uunionsq
Using this lemma, we will now show that the allocation computed by ALG is (3 + o(1))-EF.
Theorem 2. Given a cake-division instance
〈
[n], {va}a∈[n]
〉
with piecewise-constant valuations, and constant
ε ∈ (0, 1/3], ALG computes a (3 + 9εn )-approximately envy-free allocation in polynomial time.
Proof To bound the algorithm’s time complexity note that in every iteration the selected agent’s valu-
ation (for the interval assigned to it) additively goes up by ε
n2
: in Steps 3 and 4, for the selected agent
â, we have vâ([ˆ`, râ]) = vâ(Pâ) + εn2 . Since the total value of the cake for every agent is equal to one,
ALG will iterate at most ε−1 n3 times. Also, note that every step of the algorithm can be implemented
efficiently and ε is set to be a constant. Hence, ALG runs in polynomial time.
As observed in the proof of Lemma 1, the collection of intervals, P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, considered by
ALG in Step 8 is indeed a partial allocation, i.e., the intervals Pas with which the while-loop terminates
are pairwise disjoint. Let UP be the set of unassigned intervals induced by the final partial allocation P .
Also, write I = {I1, . . . , In} to denote the allocation returned by ALG; note that Pa ⊆ Ia for all agents
a ∈ [n]. Also, since P contains n intervals, |UP | ≤ n+ 1.
Summing inequality (2) (see Lemma 1) across all intervals Q ∈ P ∪ UP gives us
(2n+ 1) va(Pa) ≥
∑
Q∈P∪ UP
va(Q)− 2n ε
n2
= 1− 2ε
n
(3)
The last equality holds since
⋃
Q∈P∪ UP Q = [0, 1].
This inequality provides the following lower bound on the value attained by any agent a ∈ [n] in
the returned allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}: va(Ia) ≥ va(Pa) ≥ 12n+1 − 2εn(2n+1) . Therefore, with n ≥ 3 and
ε ≤ 1/3,14 we have the following bound:
3ε
n
va(Ia) ≥ ε
n2
(4)
By construction, for each agent b ∈ [n], the returned interval Ib is composed of Pb and at most two
other unassigned intervals from UP . Therefore, instantiating inequality (2) with Pb ∈ P ∪ UP and the
(at most two) unassigned intervals associated with it, we get 3va(Pa) ≥ va(Ib) − 3εn2 . That is, 3va(Ia) ≥
va(Ib)− 3εn2 .
Using this inequality and the bound (4), we obtain the desired approximate envy-freeness guarantee(
3 + 9εn
)
va(Ia) ≥ va(Ib) for all a, b ∈ [n]. uunionsq
14For the n = 2 case one can efficiently find an envy-free allocation (i.e., a 1-EF allocation) by the cut-and-choose proto-
col [Pro15].
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Remark. Theorem 2 provides a proof of existence of approximately envy-free cake divisions. Indeed, this existential
guarantee also follows from the (stronger) result of Su [Su99]. However, in contrast to [Su99], the current proof
renders an efficient algorithm and relies on a potential argument–the proof in [Su99] invokes Sperner’s Lemma
and, hence, achieves totality through a parity argument.
Next, we will show that the allocations computed by ALG are not only (3 + o(1))-EF, but they also
provide a (3 + o(1))-approximation to Nash social welfare.
The following theorem shows that an approximation ratio close to 3 can be obtained for the Nash
social welfare maximization problem when the number of agents, n, is appropriately large. Such an ap-
proximation guarantee can also be achieved for constant values of n. This follows from the observation
that, for the Nash social welfare maximization problem, one can compute an α-approximate solution
(with α > 1) in time
(
n
logα
)O(n)
; see Appendix C for details. Therefore, for any number of agents,
maximizing Nash social welfare admits a polynomial-time (3 + o(1))-approximation algorithm.
Theorem 3. In cake-division instances with piecewise-constant valuations, the problem of maximizing Nash
social welfare (with connected pieces) admits a polynomial-time
(
3 + 5n
)
-approximation algorithm; here n is the
number of agents participating in the cake-cutting exercise.
Proof Let I = {I1, . . . , In} be the allocation returned by ALG and write P = {P1, . . . , Pn} to denote
the final partial allocation considered by ALG (i.e., P is the partial allocation with which the while-loop
terminates). As before, UP denotes the set of unassigned intervals induced by P . Note that, for each
agent a ∈ [n], the following containment holds Pa ⊂ Ia; hence, va(Ia) ≥ va(Pa).
Let I∗a denote the interval assigned to agent a ∈ [n] in the Nash optimal allocation I∗ = {I∗1 , . . . , I∗n}.
Also, writeKa to denote the set of intervals in the collection P∪UP that intersect with I∗a (see Figure 3 for
an illustration), Ka := {Q ∈ P ∪ UP | Q ∩ I∗a 6= ∅}.15 Let ka denote the cardinality of this set, ka := |Ka|.
Since ∪Q∈P∪UPQ = [0, 1], interval I∗a is covered by the union of intervals in Ka; I∗a ⊆ ∪Q∈KaQ.
0 1
P ∪ UP
U PaPb Pc
{ Ka
0 1I∗a
I∗
U ′
Figure 3: In this example, I∗a intersects with four intervals from P ∪ UP ; in particular, Ka = {U,Pb, U ′, Pc} with ka = 4,
and the right endpoints of three of them (namely, U , Pb, and U ′) are contained in I∗a , i.e., `a = 3.
Lemma 1 gives us va(Pa) ≥ va(Q)− ε/n2 for all Q ∈ Ka; as before, ε ∈ (0, 1/3] is the constant used in
ALG. In addition, recall that va(Ia) ≥ va(Pa) and 3εn va(Ia) ≥ ε/n2 (see equation (4)). These observations
imply that (
1 +
3ε
n
)
va(Ia) ≥ va(Q) for all Q ∈ Ka
Summing these inequalities and using the containment I∗a ⊆ ∪Q∈KaQ we get16(
1 +
3ε
n
)
ka va(Ia) ≥ va(I∗a) for all a ∈ [n].
15Here, we follow the above-mentioned convention that mandates two intervals to be disjoint, if they intersect exactly at an
endpoint.
16Recall that the valuations are sigma additive.
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Therefore,
(∏n
a=1
[(
1 + 3εn
)
ka va(Ia)
])1/n ≥ (∏a va(I∗a))1/n = NSW(I∗). Simplifying this equation
gives us
NSW(I∗) ≤
(
1 +
3ε
n
)( n∏
a=1
ka
)1/n ( n∏
a=1
va(Ia)
)1/n
=
(
1 +
3ε
n
)( n∏
a=1
ka
)1/n
NSW(I) (5)
Next, we will show, via a simple counting argument, that
∑n
a=1 ka ≤ 3n + 1. For an interval I∗a in the
Nash optimal allocation, write `a to denote the number of intervals in the collection P ∪ UP whose right
endpoint in contained in I∗a . Note that ka ≤ `a + 1 for all a ∈ [n]; at most one interval in Ka ends after
I∗a . Therefore,
∑n
a=1 ka ≤ n +
∑n
a=1 `a ≤ 3n + 1. The last inequality follows from the observation that
the total number of right endpoints across intervals in P ∪UP (i.e.,
∑n
a=1 `a) is at most 2n+ 1, since each
right endpoint is associated with exactly one interval from P ∪UP (recall that |P| = n and |UP | ≤ n+ 1).
The AM-GM inequality implies (
∏n
a=1 ka)
1/n ≤ 1n
∑n
a=1 ka ≤ 3 + 1n . This bound, along with inequal-
ity (5),17 establishes the stated approximation guarantee:
(
3 + 5n
)
NSW(I) ≥ (3 + 1n) (1 + 3εn )NSW(I) ≥
NSW(I∗).
uunionsq
We conclude this section by proving that the approximately envy-free allocations always have near-
optimal Nash social welfare. Note that, directly invoking the following theorem for the (3 + o(1))-EF
allocations computed by ALG, one would essentially obtain an approximation ratio of six for the Nash
social welfare maximization problem. Indeed, this guarantee is weaker than the one shown (via a tai-
lored analysis) in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. In a cake-division instance, let I˜ be an α-approximately envy-free allocation and I∗ be a Nash
optimal allocation. Then,
(i) I˜ provides a 2α-approximation to Nash social welfare, i.e., NSW(I˜) ≥ 12αNSW(I∗).
(ii) I∗ is 4-approximately envy-free.
Proof Let I∗a denote the interval assigned to agent a ∈ [n] in the Nash optimal allocation I∗ =
{I∗1 , . . . , I∗n}. Also, write K˜a to denote the set of intervals in the α-EF allocation I˜ = {I˜1, . . . , I˜n} that
intersect with I∗a , i.e., K˜a := {I˜b ∈ I˜ | I˜b ∩ I∗a 6= ∅}.18 Let k˜a denote the cardinality of this set, k˜a := |K˜a|.
Since I˜ is an allocation, we have ∪aI˜a = [0, 1]. Therefore, for all agents a ∈ [n], interval I∗a is covered by
the union of intervals in K˜a; I∗a ⊆ ∪I˜∈K˜a I˜ . Also, the fact that I˜ is α-EF implies αva(I˜a) ≥ va(I˜b) for all
I˜b ∈ K˜a. Summing these inequalities and using the containment I∗a ⊆ ∪I˜∈K˜a I˜ gives us19
αk˜a va(I˜a) ≥ va(I∗a) for all a ∈ [n].
Therefore,
(∏n
a=1
(
αk˜a va(I˜a)
))1/n ≥ (∏a va(I∗a))1/n = NSW(I∗). Simplifying we get
NSW(I∗) ≤ α
(
n∏
a=1
k˜a
)1/n ( n∏
a=1
va(I˜a)
)1/n
= α
(
n∏
a=1
k˜a
)1/n
NSW(I˜) (6)
Next, we will show, via a simple counting argument, that
∑n
a=1 k˜a ≤ 2n. For an interval I∗a in the Nash
optimal allocation, write ˜`a to denote the number of intervals in allocation I˜ = {I˜1, . . . , I˜n} whose right
17Recall that ε ≤ 1/3.
18Here, we follow the above-mentioned convention that mandates two intervals to be disjoint, if they intersect exactly at an
endpoint.
19Recall that the valuations are sigma additive.
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endpoint in contained in I∗a . Note that k˜a ≤ ˜`a + 1 for all a ∈ [n]; at most one interval in K˜a ends after
I∗a . Therefore,
∑n
a=1 k˜a ≤ n +
∑n
a=1
˜`
a = 2n. The last inequality follows from the observation that the
total number of right endpoints across intervals in I˜ (i.e.,∑na=1 ˜`a) is exactly equal to n, since each right
endpoint is associated with exactly one interval.
The AM-GM inequality implies
(∏n
a=1 k˜a
)1/n ≤ 1n∑na=1 k˜a ≤ 2. This bound, along with inequality
(6), establishes the stated approximation guarantee: 2α NSW(I˜) ≥ NSW(I∗).
To prove the complementary part of the Theorem (part (ii)) assume, towards a contradiction, that
I∗ = {I∗1 , . . . , I∗n} is not 4-EF. That is, there exist agents a and b such that va(I∗a) < 14va(I∗b ). The
divisibility of valuations ensures that the interval I∗b can be partitioned into two disjoint intervals I
′
b and
I ′′b with the property that vb(I
′
b) = vb(I
′′
b ) =
1
2vb(I
∗
b ).
Furthermore, since the valuations are sigma additive, for agent a either interval I ′b or I
′′
b is of value
strictly greater than 2va(I∗a). Say, va(I ′′b ) > 2va(I
∗
a). Now, consider a partial allocation J = {J1, . . . , Jn}
obtained by setting Jc = I∗c for all c ∈ [n] \ {a, b}, Ja = I ′′b and Jb = I ′b. Note that va(Ja)vb(Jb) >
va(I
∗
a)vb(I
∗
b ), hence we have NSW(J ) > NSW(I∗). Given that any partial allocation can be extended
to an allocation without decreasing the Nash social welfare, the previous inequality contradicts the
optimality of I∗. This establishes part (ii) of the theorem and completes the proof. uunionsq
4 Approximation Algorithm for ρ-Mean Welfare Maximization
This section addresses cake-division with the objective of maximizing the ρ-mean welfare. We obtain an
approximation algorithm for this problem via a simple reduction to the weighted job interval selection
problem (JISP) [ES03; BNGNS01].
A problem instance of JISP consists of a tuple 〈[n], {Ji, wi}i∈[n]〉, where n denotes the number of
jobs,20 and for each job i ∈ [n] we have Ji, a collection of intervals in [0, 1]. Here, every interval in Ji
is endowed with a weight wi : Ji 7→ R+. The goal of JISP is to select a collection of non-intersecting
intervals such that at most one interval is selected from each Ji and the total weight of the collection is
as large as possible. Formally, a feasible solution to a JISP problem instance consists of a set of intervals
F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} such that: (i) all the selected intervals are pairwise disjoint, Fi∩Fj = ∅ for all i 6= j.
(ii) at most one interval is selected from each job: Fi ∈ Ji or Fi is the empty interval, for all i ∈ [n].
The objective of JISP is to find a feasible solution F = {F1, . . . , Fn} that maximizes
∑
i∈[n]wi(Fi).
21
For a solution F , we denote the value of this weight objective by w(F).
The following lemma shows that, given a cake-division instance, we can construct a JISP instance
such that the ρ-mean welfare is approximated by the weight objective. That is, the lemma presents an
approximation-preserving reduction from cake division to interval scheduling.
Lemma 5. Given a cake-division instance 〈[n], {va}a〉 with piecewise-constant valuations along with parameters
ρ ∈ (0, 1] and ε ∈ (0, 1], one can construct a JISP instance 〈[n], {Ji, wi}i∈[n]〉, in time
(
n
ε
)O(1/ρ), such that
1. If Î = {Î1, . . . , În} is an allocation that maximizes the ρ-mean welfare in the given cake-division instance,
then there exists a feasible solution F = {F1, F2, . . . Fn} of the JISP instance such that∑
i∈[n]
wi(Fi)
1/ρ ≥ (1− ε
n
)1+ 1
ρ
∑
a∈[n]
[
va(Îa)
]ρ1/ρ
20In the developed reduction, the number of jobs will be set equal to the number of agents present in the cake-division
instance, hence we overload n to denote both of these quantities.
21We follow the convention that the weight of the empty interval is equal to zero.
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2. For every feasible JISP solution F = {F1, F2, . . . Fn}, there exists a partial allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} in
the cake-division instance with the property that (
∑
a [va(Ia)]
ρ)1/ρ = (
∑
iw(Fi))
1/ρ. Furthermore, partial
allocation I can be computed from the given JISP solution F in polynomial time.
Proof First, we describe the construction of a JISP instance from the given cake-division instance. The
reduction is based on discretizing the cake.
Let δ :=
(
ε
n2
)1/ρ, where ε ∈ (0, 1] is a given parameter. We find a set of O ((ε−1 n2)1+ 1ρ) points
(cake cuts) 0 = x0 < x1 < x2 < . . . , xk < xk+1 = 1 such that for every index ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} and
each agent a ∈ [n] we have va([x`, x`+1]) ≤ δε2n . The procedure to find these points starts by initializing
x0 = 0. Then, iteratively, for each ` ≥ 0, we find x`+1 using x`: for each agent a, find the smallest value
ca ∈ (x`, 1] such that va([x`, ca]) = δε2n .22 If for an agent a we have va([x`, 1]) < δε2n , then assign ca = 1.
We set x`+1 := mina∈[n] ca and continue as long as x`+1 < 1. Write X := {x0, x1, . . . , xk+1} to denote
this set of points and note that the normalization of the agents’ valuations ensures that the cardinality
of O
((
ε−1 n2
)1+ 1
ρ
)
.
The reduction to JISP is as follows. For each agent a ∈ [n], we associate a job with the same index in
the JISP instance 〈[n], {Ja, wa}a∈[n]〉. Furthermore, for each a ∈ [n], the set Ja is defined to be collection
of all intervals with endpoints in the computed set of cuts X , i.e., Ja := {[x`, xr] | 0 ≤ ` < r ≤ k +
1 and `, r ∈ Z}. Note that the set of intervals is the same for all jobs. Each weight function wa is defined
as wa([x`, xr]) := (va([x`, xr]))
ρ for all intervals [x`, xr] ∈ Ja.
Now, we will prove the first part of the Lemma. Consider Î = {Î1, Î2, · · · , În}, an allocation that
maximizes the ρ-mean welfare. From Î , we obtain a feasible solution F = {F1, . . . , Fn} by setting Fa, for
each a ∈ [n], to be the largest interval of the form [x`, xr] ∈ Ja that is contained within Îa. Specifically,
if Îa = [y, z], then Fa = [x`, xr] ∈ Ja where ` := minxi≥y i and r := maxxj≤z j.23 Excluding the (trivial)
corner cases, we have x`−1 < y ≤ x` and xr ≤ z < xr+1. Note that Fa is obtained by removing
subintervals at the two ends of Îa. These removed subintervals are of value at most va([x`−1, x`]) ≤ δε2n
and va([xr, xr+1]) ≤ δε2n , respectively. Hence, using the fact that the valuations are sigma additive, we
obtain the following bound on the value lost in discretizing Îa to obtain Fa:
va(Îa)− va(Fa) ≤ 2× δε
2n
=
δε
n
(7)
Since the intervals in the optimal allocation Î are pairwise disjoint and each Fa ∈ Ja (or Fa is the empty
interval), the collection F = {F1, F2, · · ·Fn} is a feasible solution of the JISP instance.
For analysis, we partition the set of agents (and correspondingly the jobs) into low-valued and high-
valued agents. In particular, define S1 := {a ∈ [n] | va(Îa) ≤ δ} and S2 = [n] \ S1 to be the remaining
agents.
For all agents a ∈ S1, by definition, we have[
va(Îa)
]ρ ≤ (( ε
n2
)1/ρ)ρ
=
ε
n2
(8)
For all jobs a ∈ S2
wa(Fa) = [va(Fa)]
ρ
≥
[
va(Îa)− δε
n
]ρ
(via (7))
≥
[
va(Îa)
(
1− ε
n
)]ρ
(since va(Îa) ≥ δ)
≥
(
1− ε
n
)ρ [
va(Îa)
]ρ
(9)
22This step can be performed efficiently in the Robertson-Webb model, as well as for piecewise-constant valuations.
23If Îa is the empty interval, then so is Fa.
12
Let T be the optimal ρ-mean welfare in the given cake-division instance, i.e., T = Mρ(Î) =
(
1
n
∑n
a=1
[
va(Îa)
]ρ)1/ρ
.
Note that T ≥ 1/n, since the ρ-mean welfare of a proportional division of the cake is at least 1/n. Given
that S1 and S2 partition [n], we have 1n
∑
a∈S1
[
va(Îa)
]ρ
+ 1n
∑
a∈S2
[
va(Îa)
]ρ
= T ρ. Using inequality (8),
we obtain a lower bound on the contribution of the agents in S2 to the ρ-mean welfare
1
n
∑
a∈S2
[
va(Îa)
]ρ ≥ T ρ − 1
n
n
ε
n2
≥
(
1− ε
n
)
T ρ (since T ≥ 1/n and ρ ∈ (0, 1])
Equation (9) connects this lower bound to the weight of the feasible solution F
1
n
∑
a∈S2
wa(Fa) ≥
(
1− ε
n
)(
1− ε
n
)ρ
T ρ =
(
1− ε
n
)(
1− ε
n
)ρ 1
n
(
n∑
a=1
[
va(Îa)
]ρ)
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by n, we get24∑
a∈[n]
wa(Fa)
 ≥ (1− ε
n
)(
1− ε
n
)ρ( n∑
a=1
[
va(Îa)
]ρ)
Finally, we obtain the desired inequality by exponentiating both sides of the previous inequality to the
power 1ρ ∑
a∈[n]
wa(Fa)
1/ρ ≥ (1− ε
n
)(
1− ε
n
) 1
ρ
(
n∑
a=1
[
va(Îa)
]ρ) 1ρ
This concludes the proof of the first part of the Lemma.
For the second part of the Lemma, note that every feasible solution F = {F1, F2, · · · , Fn} of the JISP
instance can also be mapped directly to an (partial) allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} of the cake: each agent a
receives the interval Ia = Fa ⊆ [0, 1], which (by feasibility of F) does not intersect with any other agent’s
interval. Also, by definition of the weights, wa(Fa) = [va(Fa)]ρ = [va(Ia)]ρ, which gives us the desired
equality.
uunionsq
This lemma allows us to directly invoke the result of Bar-Noy et al. [BNGNS01] (which provides
a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for JISP) to obtain an approximation algorithm for the
ρ-mean maximization problem. The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For ρ ∈ (0, 1], ε ∈ (0, 1) and cake-division instances C = 〈[n], {va}a∈[n]〉 with piecewise-constant
valuations, there exists an algorithm that—in time
(
n
ε
)O(1/ρ)—finds a (2 + 4εen ) 1ρ -approximation to the ρ-mean
welfare maximization problem.
Proof For the given cake-division instance, we instantiate Lemma 5 to construct a JISP instance
〈[n], {Ji, wi}i∈[n]〉 in time
(
n
ε
)O(1/ρ).
Let Î = {Î1, . . . , În} be an allocation in the cake-division instance that maximizes the ρ-mean welfare.
The first part of Lemma 5 asserts that there there exists a feasible solution F in the constructed JISP
24Recall that the weights of all the intervals in the JISP instance are nonnegative.
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instance such that
(w(F)) 1ρ ≥
(
1− ε
n
) 1
ρ
+1
∑
a∈[n]
[
va(Îa)
]ρ1/ρ ≥ e− εn( 1ρ+1)
∑
a∈[n]
[
va(Îa)
]ρ1/ρ
≥ e− εn 2ρ
∑
a∈[n]
[
va(Îa)
]ρ1/ρ (10)
The last inequality follows from the fact that 1/ρ ≥ 1.
Let F∗ be an optimal solution of the JISP instance, i.e., F∗ has the maximum possible weight, w(F∗),
among all feasible solutions.
The algorithm of Bar-Noy et al. [BNGNS01] achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for JISP, i.e., it
efficiently computes a feasible schedule G = {G1, G2, . . . , Gn} which satisfies, w(G) ≥ 12w(F∗). Note
that, using the second part of Lemma 5, we can efficiently find an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} (in the
underlying cake-division instance) such that
(∑
a∈[n] [va(Ia)]
ρ
)
= w(G) ≥ 12w(F∗). Exponentiating both
sides of the previous inequality to the power 1ρ gives us
∑
a∈[n]
[va(Ia)]
ρ
 1ρ ≥ (1
2
) 1
ρ
(w(F∗)) 1ρ ≥ 2− 1ρ e− 2εnρ
∑
a∈[n]
[
va(Îa)
]ρ1/ρ
The last inequality follows from (10) and the optimality of F∗. To obtain the desired approximation
guarantee we divide both sides of the previous equation by n
1
ρ
Mρ(I) ≥ 2−
1
ρ e
− 2ε
nρ Mρ(Î)
=
(
2 e2ε/n
)−1/ρ
Mρ(Î)
≥
(
2 +
4εe
n
)−1/ρ (
1− ε
n
)
Mρ(Î) (since 1/ρ ≥ 1 and 2 + 4εen ≥ 2e2ε/n for n ≥ 2)
Therefore, the computed allocation I achieves the stated approximation ratio of (2 + 4εen )1/ρ.
For establishing the time complexity of this algorithm, note that the size of the constructed JISP
instance is
(
n
ε
)O(1/ρ). Hence, the algorithm of Bar-Noy et al. [BNGNS01] would run in time that is
polynomial in
(
n
ε
)O(1/ρ), i.e., the specified running-time bound follows. uunionsq
Note that for any constant ρ ∈ (0, 1], Theorem 6 provides a constant-factor approximation algorithm
that runs in polynomial time. In particular, for the ρ = 1 case (i.e., for average social welfare), we ob-
tain a polynomial-time (2 + o(1))-approximation algorithm. As mentioned previously, this instantiation
improves upon the 8-approximation guarantee obtained specifically for social welfare in the work of
Aumann et al. [ADH13].
5 Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare
This section establishes the APX-hardness of finding cake divisions (with connected pieces) that maxi-
mize Nash social welfare. That is, we show that, for a fixed constant c ∈ (0, 1), it is NP-hard to find an
allocation (i.e., a cake division with connected pieces) whose Nash social welfare is within c times the
optimal. Appendix B details an analogous hardness result for the ρ-mean welfare objective.
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Theorem 7. Given a cake-division instance with piecewise-constant valuations, the problem of computing an
allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare is APX-hard.
We prove this theorem by developing a (gap-preserving) reduction from the Gap 3-SAT-5 prob-
lem [AKK99; ALM+98]. Section 5.1 presents the key gadget used in the reduction and the proof of
Theorem 7 appears in Section 5.2.
The Gap 3-SAT-5 problem, with parameter α ∈ (0, 1), is defined as follows
Input: A Boolean formula φ in conjunctive normal form; in particular, φ is specified as a conjunction of a
set of clauses, C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, defined over Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xr}. Here, each clause
Cj is a disjunction of at most three literals and every variable xi appears in at most five clauses in φ
(either as literal xi or as its negation xi).
Objective: Distinguish between the following two cases
YES: φ is satisfiable.
NO: No assignment of the variables satisfies more than (1− α) fraction of the clauses in φ.
Gap 3-SAT-5 is a promise problem: the given Boolean formula φ is guaranteed to satisfy either the
YES case or the NO case. It is shown in [AKK99; ALM+98] that there exists a constantα ∈ (0, 1) for which
Gap 3-SAT-5 is NP-hard, i.e., for a specific constant α ∈ (0, 1), it is NP-hard to distinguish whether a
given instance of Gap 3-SAT-5 satisfies the YES case or the NO case.
We develop a gap-preserving reduction from Gap 3-SAT-5 to the Nash social welfare maximization
problem. That is, in our reduction, if the given Gap 3-SAT-5 instance satisfies the YES case, then the
Nash social welfare in the constructed cake-division instance will be above a threshold, say τ . Comple-
mentarily, in the NO case, the Nash social welfare will be below c(α) τ , for a fixed constant c(α) ∈ (0, 1),
which depends only on the underlying gap parameter α. Therefore, using a (1/c(α))-approximation
algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem, one can distinguish between the YES and
the NO cases of Gap 3-SAT-5. Since the latter problem is NP-hard, such an approximation algorithm
does not exist, unless P = NP. That is, we obtain (1/c(α))-inapproximability of maximizing Nash social
welfare and, hence, the stated APX-hardness result holds.
5.1 Construction of a Cake-Division Instance
In this section, starting with an instance φ of Gap 3-SAT-5, we will construct a cake-division instance
C(φ) which achieves the above-mentioned gap property for Nash social welfare. This construction is
used in Section 5.2 to complete the reduction and prove Theorem 7.
Let r and m, respectively, denote the number of variables and the number of clauses in a given
Boolean formula φ. Recall that for Gap 3-SAT-5 instances each variable occurs in at most five clauses.
Furthermore, since each clause in φ contains at most three literals, we have r ≤ 3m.
In the reduction, for ease of presentation, the constructed cake will correspond to the segment
[0, 14r + 1] (it can be rescaled to [0, 1] without affecting the arguments). The cake will be composed
of r pairwise-disjoint intervals, H1, . . . ,Hr, each of length 14, along with an auxiliary interval G (placed
at the end of the cake) of length one. That is, the cake is obtained by concatenating His and G. For
all i ∈ [r], we associate variable xi with the interval Hi := [14(i − 1), 14i]. The cake-division instance
will have one agent for every clause Cj , with j ∈ [m]. In addition, the interval Hi is itself partitioned
into 14 unit-length subintervals, {eik}14k=1 (see Figure 4). A notable property of the reduction is that each
subinterval eik gets valued by at most one agent.
The cake-division instance C(φ) will have four sets of agents: (1) separator agents, (2) base agents,
(3) clause agents and, (4) an auxiliary agent. We will say that an agent a’s value within an interval I is
constant iff a’s density function is constant throughout I = [`, r], i.e., we have va(I) = w and this value is
said to be constant within I iff the density function, νa, satisfies νa(x) = w(r−`) for all x ∈ I = [`, r]. Next,
we specify the valuations of all the agents based on their type.
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• Separator Agents: We include 2r separator agents–two separator agents si and s′i for each interval Hi.
The density function of both si and s′i is nonzero only within Hi. Specifically, vsi(e
i
7) = 1 and the value
of si is constant within this subinterval ei7. Also, we set vs′i(e
i
14) = 1 and this value is constant within
ei14.
The separator agent si is introduced in the reduction to ensure that, in any Nash optimal allocation, no
single agent receives both the left and right halves ofHi. At a high level, the left-half ofHi represents the
positive occurrences of the variable xi in φ and right-half represents the negated occurrences. Similarly,
the presence of the separator agent s′i ensures that, in any Nash optimal allocation, no agent receives
an interval which nontrivially intersects with both Hi and Hi+1.25
1/4
zi
1/4
zi
ei1 e
i
2 e
i
3 e
i
4 e
i
5 e
i
6 e
i
7 e
i
8 e
i
9 e
i
10
1
si
Positive part of Hi
1/4
zi
1/4
zi
1
s′i
Negative part of Hi
ei11 e
i
12 e
i
13 e
i
14
1/3
aj
Figure 4: The figure depicts interval Hi associated with variable xi. The height of a vertical bar over each subinterval eik
depicts the total value of eik for the agent mentioned above the bar. As an illustration, the value of a clause agent, aj , is also
depicted; here, clause Cj is the third negative occurrence of xi (in particular, Cj contains the literal xi).
• Base Agents: We include r base agents–one base agent zi for each interval Hi, with i ∈ [r]. The total
value of zi is spread over four subintervals in Hi. Specifically, vzi(S) = 1/4 for each subinterval S ∈
{ei1, ei6, ei8, ei13} and the value of zi is constant within each of these four subintervals.
• Clause Agents: We consider m clause agents–one clause agent aj for each clause Cj , with j ∈ [m].
Here, agent aj values a subinterval in Hi iff clause Cj contains the variable xi. Hence, the number of
subintervals valued by aj is equal to the number of literals in clause Cj . For each variable xi, we (ar-
bitrarily) index the clauses (in φ) that contain it as a positive literal, i.e., define Pi := {Ci1, Ci2, . . . , Cip∗ |
literal xi appears in Cik for all k ∈ [p∗]}; here p∗ is the total number of clauses that contains xi as a posi-
tive literal. Analogously, index the clauses (in φ) that contain the negated literal xi,Ni := {Ci1, Ci2, . . . , Cin∗ |
literal xi appears in Cik for all k ∈ [n∗]}. Given that at most five clauses contain xi, we have p∗+n∗ ≤ 5.
Also, since both literals xi and xi must occur in φ, we have p∗ ≥ 1 and n∗ ≥ 1. Equivalently, p∗ ≤ 4
and n∗ ≤ 4; this bound enables us to consider at most four subintervals {ei2, . . . , ei5} and {ei8, . . . , ei12}
in the two halves of Hi, respectively. With this indexing in hand, we will refer to a clause Cj as the qth
positive occurrence of xi iff Cj = Ciq ∈ Pi. Similarly, we will refer to a clause Ck as the qth negative
occurrence of xi iff Ck = Ciq ∈ Ni.
As mentioned above, to set the valuation of the clause agent aj we consider the variables that occur in
the clauseCj . For each variable xi inCj , ifCj is the qth positive occurrence of xi then we set vaj (e
i
1+q) =
1/3. Otherwise, if Cj is the qth negative occurrence of variable xi then we set vaj (e
i
8+q) = 1/3. If Cj
contains less than three variables, then aj is made to positively value the auxiliary interval G by an
amount that ensures normalization vaj ([0, 14r + 1]) = 1. In particular, in case Cj is a disjunction of
1 ≤ t ≤ 3 literals, we set vaj (G) = 1− t/3.
25The separator agent s′r accomplishes this goal for interval Hr and the auxiliary interval G.
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In light of this construction, we will henceforth refer to the left half of the interval Hi, {ei1, . . . , ei6}, to be
the positive part, while the right half, {ei8, . . . , ei13}, to be the negative part of Hi.
• Auxiliary Agent: Finally, we have one auxiliary agent d whose total valuation is confined to auxiliary
interval G, i.e., vd(G) = 1 and this value is constant within G.
In summary, we have constructed in polynomial-time a cake instance C(φ) with 2r separator agents,
r base agents, m clause agents and 1 auxiliary agent; hence n = 3r + m + 1. Also, note that in the
constructed instance, the valuation of every agent a is piecewise-constant and normalized, va([0, 14r +
1]) = 1.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Consider an instance of the Gap 3-SAT-5 problem, with Boolean formula φ and parameter α. Recall
that, Gap 3-SAT-5 is a promise problem wherein it is NP-hard to distinguish between the YES case (φ
is satisfiable) and the NO case (no assignment satisfies more than (1 − α) fraction of the clauses in φ).
Denote the set of variables in φ by X = {x1, x2, . . . , xr} and the set of clauses by C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}.
Construct a cake-division instance C(φ) as detailed in Section 5.1. Independent of the underlying case
(YES or NO), the following claim ensures the existence of a Nash optimal allocation for C(φ) with useful
structural properties.
Claim 1. The cake-division instance C(φ) admits a Nash optimal allocation I = {Ia}a with the property that:26
(i) For each i ∈ [r], base agent zi is assigned exactly one of the following intervals: ei1,
⋃6
j=1 e
i
j , e
i
8,
⋃13
j=8 e
i
j
(ii) For each i ∈ [r], Isi = ei7 and Is′i = ei14
(iii) NSW(I) > 0
The proof of Claim 1 is deferred to Appendix A.1. We will now proceed to prove Theorem 7.
First, suppose that φ satisfies the YES case, i.e., there exists a Boolean assignment f : X → {0, 1}
to the variables that satisfies all clauses in φ. Using f , we define a partial allocation A = {Aa}a that
achieves “high” Nash social welfare. In particular, for all i ∈ [r], assign agent si the subinterval ei7 (i.e.,
Asi = e
i
7 ) and assign agent s
′
i the subinterval e
i
14. In addition, allocate agent zi the interval
⋃6
j=1 e
i
j , if
f(xi) = 0. Otherwise, if f(xi) = 1, assign the interval
⋃13
j=8 e
i
j to zi. That is, zi is allocated the positive
part of Hi if f(xi) = 0 and the negative part of Hi, if f(xi) = 1. Since f satisfies all the clauses, every
clause Cj either contains a literal xi for which f(xi) = 1 or a literal xk with f(xk) = 0. Therefore, one
of the following alternatives holds, for an index q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}: Cj is the qth positive occurrence of
variable xi with f(xi) = 1 or Cj is the qth negative occurrence of variable xk with f(xk) = 0. If the
former condition holds, then allocate the interval ei1+q to the clause agent aj . Otherwise, if the latter
condition holds, assign the interval ek8+q to agent aj . Finally, allocate interval G to auxiliary agent d, i.e.,
set Ad = G. One can directly verify that A is a well-defined partial allocation in C(φ). Also, since the
valuations of the agents are nonnegative, A can be extended to a full allocation without reducing the
value achieved by any agent. Let NSWY denote the optimal Nash social welfare value obtained in C(φ),
under the current assumption that φ satisfies the YES case. Noting the values obtained by all the agents
under A, we get
NSWY ≥
(
12r
1
2r
1
3m
1
) 1
3r+m+1
(11)
To complete the proof we now consider the complementary setting wherein φ falls under the NO
case, i.e., under any assignment, at least αm clauses remain unsatisfied. In C(φ), let I = {Ia}a be a Nash
26Recall that Ia denotes the interval assigned to agent a, under allocation I = {Ia}a.
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optimal allocation that satisfies Claim 1. With the NO case in hand, write NSWN to denote the optimal
value of the Nash social welfare in C(φ), i.e., NSWN = NSW(I). By property (ii) of Claim 1, we have
that Isi = e
i
7 and Is′i = e
i
14, for all i ∈ [r]. This allocation to the separator agents ensures that the interval
assigned to any other agent a, Ia, is contained in exactly one of the following intervals: the positive part
of Hi, or the negative part of Hi, or the auxiliary interval G.
Define the following index sets for the base agents and the clause agents, respectively, T := {i ∈
[r] | Izi = ei1 or Izi = ei8} and P := {j ∈ [m] | Iaj ⊂ G}. Write t := |T | and p := |P |. By property
(i) in Claim 1, we can conclude that the base agents zis not indexed in T (i.e., the remaining r − t base
agents) receive either
⋃6
j=1 e
i
j or
⋃13
j=8 e
i
j . Note that, for each i ∈ T , the base agent zi obtains a value
of 1/4 in I and the base agents not indexed in T obtain a value of 1/2. Indeed, in comparison to the
YES case, here the base agents indexed in T and the clause agents indexed in P receive lower values.
The following claim provides a lower bound on the number of such agents; the proof of this claim is
deferred to Appendix A.2.
Claim 2. With t and p as defined above, we have 4t+ p ≥ αm.
Note that under the allocation I, the auxiliary intervalG is divided amongst p clause agents (indexed
in P ) and the auxiliary agent d.27 The following claim upper bounds the contribution of these agents to
NSW (I).
Claim 3. In the above setting, we have vd(Id)
∏
j∈P vaj (Iaj ) ≤
(
2
3
1
p+1
)p
1
p+1 .
The proof of Claim 3 follows from basic calculations and appears in Appendix A.3. The above-
mentioned observations and Claim 3 give us the following upper bound on NSWN (the optimal Nash
social welfare in C(φ)):
NSWN = NSW(I) ≤
(
12r
1
4t
1
2r−t
1
3m−p
(
2
3
1
p+ 1
)p 1
p+ 1
) 1
3r+m+1
(12)
Write τ :=
(
12r 12r
1
3m 1
) 1
3r+m+1 and c(α) := 2−α/44. Using Claim 2, equation (12), and the observa-
tion that r ≤ 3m, we obtain the following inequality: NSWN ≤ c(α)τ ; see Appendix A.4 for details.
Also, equation (11) gives us NSWY ≥ τ . Therefore, using a (1/c(α))-approximation algorithm for the
Nash social welfare maximization problem, one can distinguish between the YES and the NO cases of
Gap 3-SAT-5. Since the latter problem is NP-hard, such an approximation algorithm does not exist,
unless P = NP. That is, we obtain (1/c(α))-inapproximability of maximizing Nash social welfare and,
hence, Theorem 7 holds.
6 Price of Envy-Freeness
In this section we establish an upper bound on the price of envy-freeness for ρ-mean welfare. The price
of envy-freeness with respect to a welfare objective (such as social welfare or, more generally, ρ-mean
welfare) is defined as the ratio of the optimal value of the welfare objective among all possible divisions
and the optimal value of the welfare objective among all envy-free divisions (i.e., the optimal value
achieved under the envy-freeness constraint). Theorem 8 establishes an upper bound on the price of
envy-freeness achieved by α-EF allocations for ρ-mean welfare, with α ≥ 1 and ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Note that, along these lines, Theorem 4 implies an upper bound of 2α on the price of envy-freeness
obtained by α-EF allocations for Nash social welfare (i.e., for the ρ→ 0 case).
27Id ⊆ G follows from the fact that NSW(I) > 0 (property (iii) in Claim 1), i.e., vd(Id) > 0, and the auxiliary agent d has
nonzero valuation (density) only within G.
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Furthermore, as a direct consequence of Theorem 8 and Theorem 2, we get that ALG provides an
O(2 1ρ n ρρ+1 )-approximate solution to maximizing ρ-mean welfare for ρ ∈ (0, 1]. For constant ρ ∈ (0, 1],
this approximation factor is weaker than the one obtained in Theorem 6. However, the result obtained
here is universal in the sense that a single allocation achieves the guarantee for all ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Theorem 8. Let I be an α-approximately envy-free allocation in a cake-division instance C = {[n], {va}a}, with
α ≥ 1. Then, for any ρ ∈ (0, 1], I provides a
(
2α 2
1
ρ n
ρ
ρ+1
)
-approximate solution to maximizing ρ-mean welfare
in C.
Proof Fix ρ ∈ (0, 1] and let I∗ = {I∗1 , . . . , I∗n} be an optimal allocation with respect to the ρ-mean
welfare. For a ∈ [n], write Ka to denote the set of intervals in the α-EF allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} that
intersect with I∗a , i.e., Ka := {Ib ∈ I | Ib ∩ I∗a 6= ∅}.28 Let ka denote the cardinality of this set, ka := |Ka|.
Since I is an allocation, we have ∪aIa = [0, 1]. Therefore, for all agents a ∈ [n], interval I∗a is covered
by the union of intervals in Ka; I∗a ⊆ ∪I∈KaI . Also, the fact that I is α-approximately envy-free implies
αva(Ia) ≥ va(Ib) for all Ib ∈ Ka. Summing these inequalities and using the containment I∗a ⊆ ∪I∈KaI
gives us29 αka va(Ia) ≥ va(I∗a) for all a ∈ [n].
Furthermore, the normalization of valuations (va([0, 1]) = 1), gives us min{1, αka va(Ia)} ≥ va(I∗a)
for all a ∈ [n].
Define a subset of players,H := {a ∈ [n] | ka ≥ 2n
ρ
ρ+1 }. Note that 2n ρρ+1 |H| ≤∑a∈H ka ≤∑na=1 ka ≤
2n; here, the last inequality follows from a counting argument, which is detailed in the proof of Theo-
rem 4. These inequalities imply the following upper bound on the size ofH: |H| ≤ n1− ρρ+1 .
Considering the optimal ρ-mean welfare value
Mρ(I∗) =
(
1
n
n∑
a=1
[va(I
∗
a)]
ρ
)1/ρ
=
(
1
n
∑
a∈H
[va(I
∗
a)]
ρ +
1
n
∑
a/∈H
[va(I
∗
a)]
ρ
)1/ρ
≤
(
1
n
∑
a∈H
1 +
1
n
∑
a/∈H
[αka va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
(since va(I∗a) ≤ min{1, αka va(Ia)})
≤
(
1
n
|H|+ 1
n
∑
a/∈H
[2α n
ρ
ρ+1 va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
(since ka ≤ 2n
ρ
ρ+1 for all a /∈ H)
≤
(
1
n
ρ
ρ+1
+
1
n
(
2α n
ρ
ρ+1
)ρ∑
a/∈H
[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
(since |H| ≤ n1− ρρ+1 )
Note that 1ρ ≥ 1, hence f(x) := x1/ρ is a convex function on R+. The convexity of this function gives us(
a+b
2
)1/ρ ≤ 12a1/ρ + 12b1/ρ. Simplifying we get (a+ b)1/ρ ≤ 2 1ρ−1(a1/ρ + b1/ρ).
28Here, we follow the previously mentioned convention that mandates two intervals to be disjoint, if they intersect exactly
at an endpoint.
29Recall that the valuations are sigma additive.
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We combine this observation with the bound obtained for the optimal ρ-mean welfare
Mρ(I∗) ≤
(
1
n
ρ
ρ+1
+
1
n
(
2α n
ρ
ρ+1
)ρ∑
a/∈H
[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
≤ 2 1ρ−1
 1
n
1
ρ+1
+
(
2αn
ρ
ρ+1
)( 1
n
∑
a/∈H
[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ (13)
Since I is an α-EF allocation, we have αn va(Ia) ≥
∑n
b=1 va(Ib) = va([0, 1]) = 1. That is, va(Ia) ≥ 1αn
for all a ∈ [n]. Therefore, the ρ-mean welfare of I is at least 1αn , i.e., Mρ(I) ≥ 1αn . We can hence write
1
n
1
ρ+1
≤ αn ρρ+1 Mρ(I).
This inequality and equation (13) provide the desired upper bound on the optimal ρ-mean welfare
Mρ(I∗) ≤ 2
1
ρ
−1
 1
n
1
ρ+1
+
(
2αn
ρ
ρ+1
)( 1
n
∑
a/∈H
[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ
≤ 2 1ρ−1
(
α n
ρ
ρ+1 Mρ(I) + 2α n
ρ
ρ+1 Mρ(I)
)
≤ 2α 2 1ρ n ρρ+1 Mρ(I)
uunionsq
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The current work studies cake-cutting from an algorithmic perspective and obtains approximation guar-
antees for multiple, well-studied notions of fairness and efficiency. In particular, we develop an efficient
algorithm that computes (3+o(1))-approximately envy-free allocations and, simultaneously, provides a
(3 + o(1))-approximation to Nash social welfare. We complement this algorithmic result for Nash social
welfare by proving that, in the cake-cutting context, maximizing this objective is APX-hard. Developing
hardness results for (approximate) envy-freeness remains an interesting open problem.30 Notably, the
result of Deng et al. [DQS12] shows that envy-free cake division (with connected pieces) is PPAD-hard,
but this negative result holds under ordinal valuations–in this setup the preferences of each agent is
specified via an explicit circuit which, given an allocation, identifies the agent’s most preferred piece.
Therefore, in and of itself, the result of Deng et al. [DQS12] does not imply that envy-free cake division
under cardinal valuations is PPAD-hard; complementarily, this result does not rule out an FPTAS for
the contiguous-pieces version of envy-free cake-cutting under, say, piecewise-constant valuations.
Our approximation guarantee for ρ-mean welfare degrades as ρ tends to zero. Indeed, it does not
match the approximation ratio achieved specifically for Nash social welfare. Tightening this gap is
another interesting direction for future work. Computational results for maximizing ρ-mean welfare,
with ρ < 0, will also be interesting. The ρ → −∞ case is particularly relevant, since it corresponds to
egalitarian welfare, i.e., to the max-min (Santa Claus) objective. The work of Aumann et al. [ADH13]
proves that, in the cake-division framework, it is NP-hard to approximate egalitarian welfare within
a factor of two. However, it remains open whether this problem admits a nontrivial approximation
algorithm.
30Since an envy-free cake division always exists, the hardness results here will be in terms of complexity classes contained
in TFNP.
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 5.2
A.1 Proof of Claim 1
Claim 1. The cake-division instance C(φ) admits a Nash optimal allocation I = {Ia}a with the property that:31
(i) For each i ∈ [r], base agent zi is assigned exactly one of the following intervals: ei1,
⋃6
j=1 e
i
j , e
i
8,
⋃13
j=8 e
i
j
(ii) For each i ∈ [r], Isi = ei7 and Is′i = ei14
(iii) NSW(I) > 0
Proof We will show that, independent of the underlying case for φ (YES or NO), the constructed
cake-division instance C(φ) admits a Nash optimal allocation, I = {Ia}a which satisfies the properties
mentioned in the claim.
Property (iii) can be established by noting that the following partial allocation has positive Nash
social welfare: for all i ∈ [r], allocate subinterval ei1 to agent zi, subinterval ei7 to agent si, and ei14 to
agent s′i. Say literal xi appears in the clause Cj ∈ C and, for q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, Cj is the qth positive
occurrence of xi. In this case, we allocate subinterval ei1+q to clause agent aj . In the complementary
setting, if literal xi appears in the clause Cj (with Cj being the qth negative occurrence of variable xi),
then we allocate the subinterval ei8+q to aj . Note that, in both cases, the clause agent aj obtains a positive
value under the partial allocation. Finally, assign interval G to the auxiliary agent d. These allocations
lead to a well-defined partial allocation wherein every agent receives a positive value, i.e., the partial
allocation has positive Nash social welfare. Since the valuations of the agents are nonnegative, this
partial allocation can be extended to a full allocation without reducing the value of any agent. Hence,
every Nash optimal allocation satisfies property (iii).
Let J = {Ja}a be a Nash optimal allocation in the cake-division instance C(φ). Using J , we will
define a different Nash optimal allocation, I = {Ia}a, that satisfies properties (i) and (ii).
By property (iii), we have that va(Ja) > 0 for all agents a. Hence, for all i ∈ [r], we have Jsi ∩ ei7 6= ∅
and Js′i ∩ ei14 6= ∅—agent si (s′i) has nonzero valuation (density) only within the subinterval ei7 (ei14). This
observation implies that for all i ∈ [r], the interval assigned to the base agent zi (i.e., Jzi) satisfies one of
the following cases
1. Jzi intersects with exactly one of e
i
1 and e
i
6. In this case, we set Izi := e
i
1.
2. Jzi intersects with both e
i
1 and e
i
6. In this case, we set Izi :=
⋃6
k=1 e
i
k.
3. Jzi intersects with exactly one of e
i
8 and e
i
13. In this case, we set Izi := e
i
8.
4. Jzi intersects with both e
i
8 and e
i
13. In this case, we set Izi :=
⋃13
k=8 e
i
k.
Hence, case-wise, we have defined the interval assigned to base agent zi (i.e., defined Izi) in the
allocation I. In addition, for all i ∈ [r], set Isi := ei7 and Is′i := ei14. One can verify that, for all i ∈ [r],
we have vzi(Jzi) ≤ vzi(Izi), vsi(Jsi) ≤ vsi(Isi) and vs′i(Js′i) ≤ vs′i(Is′i). That is, these modifications in
the Nash optimal allocation J do not reduce the values obtained by the base agents and the separator
agents.
Let B denote the subset of the cake [0, 14r + 1] that has been already allocated to the separator and
base agents under I, i.e., B := ⋃ri=1(Izi ∪ Isi ∪ Is′i). Write Bc to denote [0, 14r + 1] \ B. For each clause
agent aj (with j ∈ [m]) set interval Iaj := Jaj ∩ Bc. Note that Jaj ∩ Bc is indeed an interval. From
the construction of C(φ), we know that clause agents do not value any interval contained in B. Hence,
vaj (Iaj ) = vaj (Jaj ) for all j ∈ [m]. Similarly, for the auxiliary agent, set Id := Jd ∩ G (for the auxiliary
interval G, we have G ⊂ Bc) and note that vd(Id) = vd(Jd). Therefore, NSW (I) ≥ NSW (J ) and, hence,
I is a Nash optimal allocation that satisfies all the properties stated in the claim. uunionsq
31Recall that Ia denotes the interval assigned to agent a, under allocation I = {Ia}a.
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A.2 Proof of Claim 2
We consider this claim when the given Boolean formula φ satisfies the NO case. Here, I = {Ia}a is a
Nash optimal allocation in the cake-division instance C(φ) and I satisfies the properties in Claim 1. Also,
recall that T := {i ∈ [r] | Izi = ei1 or Izi = ei8} and P := {j ∈ [m] | Iaj ⊂ G}, with t := |T | and p := |P |.
Claim 2. With t and p as defined above, we have 4t+ p ≥ αm.
Proof Using I, we will define a different allocation, denoted by L = {La}a, which will be used to
extract an assignment to the Boolean variables in φ.
For all i ∈ [r], set Lsi := Isi and Ls′i := Is′i . In addition, for i /∈ T , set Lzi = Izi . On the other hand,
for i ∈ T , set Lzi :=
⋃6
k=1 e
i
k if Izi = e
i
1 and set Lzi :=
⋃13
k=8 e
i
k if Izi = e
i
8. That is, for every base agent
indexed in T , we enlarge the interval Izi to cover the entire positive part of Hi or the entire negative part
of Hi. Also, for the auxiliary agent d, assign Ld := G.
Using this, we consider the set of clause agents ajs whose initial allocations, Iajs, are now con-
tained in the enlarged allocations of the base agents; specifically, write S := {j ∈ [m] | there exists i ∈
T such that Iaj ⊂ Lzi}. Note that, for every j ∈ S, we have an intersection Iaj ∩ Lzi 6= ∅, for some
base agent zi. Also, following the definition of P , we get Iaj ∩ Ld 6= ∅, for all j ∈ P . To resolve these
intersections, for each j ∈ S ∪ P , we set Laj := ∅. Complementarily, for j /∈ S ∪ P , set Laj := Iaj . It can
be verified that L = {La}a is a well-defined allocation and under it each base agent zi receives either the
entire positive part or entire the negative part of Hi.
Note that the clause agents indexed in S are forced to receive an empty allocation and the number
of such agents (i.e., |S|) is at most 4|T | = 4t. This upper bound follows from the fact that, for any i ∈ [r],
the containment Iaj ⊂ ∪5k=2eik holds for at most four clause agents ajs–recall that vaj (Iaj ) > 0 for all
j ∈ [m] (property (iii) in Claim 1) and, hence, if this containment holds for a j ∈ [m], then it must be
the case that literal xi occurs in clause Cj . The number of occurrences of the literal xi is at most four. In
other words, only the four possible clause agents (with a nonzero value for one of the four subintervals
{ei2, . . . , ei5}) can be forced to receive an empty interval when Lzi is set to be the entire positive side of Hi
(i.e., when we set Lzi =
⋃6
k=1 e
i
k) starting with Izi = e
i
1. An identical argument holds when zi is assigned
the negative part of Hi (i.e., under the assignment Lzi =
⋃13
k=8 e
i
k) starting with Izi = e
i
8. Therefore, for
each i ∈ T , updating the allocation of base agent zi (from Izi to Lzi) results in inclusion of at most four
clause agents in S. Hence, |S| ≤ 4|T | = 4t.
Based on L, we define a Boolean assignment to the variables in φ, f : {x1, . . . , xr} → {0, 1} as follows
f(xi) :=
{
1 if Lzi =
⋃13
k=8 e
i
k
0 if Lzi =
⋃6
k=1 e
i
k
Observe that, by construction of L, f(xi) is defined for all i ∈ [r] and, for all j /∈ S ∪ P , we have
vaj (Laj ) > 0. Furthermore, observing that, for each such j ∈ [m] \ (S ∪ P ), the interval Laj does not
intersect Lzi we obtain the following useful fact: for each j ∈ [m] \ (S ∪ P ), the assigned interval Laj is
either contained in the positive part of Hi with f(xi) = 1 (and literal xi occurring in clause Cj) or Laj
is contained in the negative part of Hi with f(xi) = 0 (and literal xi occurring in clause Cj). Hence, for
every index j ∈ [m] \ (S ∪ P ), the clause Cj is satisfied by the assignment f .
Given that we are in the NO case, the number of satisfied clauses is at most (1− α)m. Therefore, the
cardinality of the set [m]\(S∪P ) is at most (1−α)m. That is, |S|+|P | ≥ αm. Using the above-mentioned
upper bound on the size of the set S (i.e., |S| ≤ 4t), we obtain the desired inequality 4t+ p ≥ αm. uunionsq
A.3 Proof of Claim 3
Recall that this claim is considered when the given Boolean formula, φ, satisfies the NO case. As before,
C(φ) is the constructed cake-division instance and I is a Nash optimal allocation (in C(φ)) which satisfies
the properties in Claim 1.
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Furthermore, P denotes the (index) set of the clause agents that share the auxiliary interval G with
the auxiliary agent d; P := {j ∈ [m] | Iaj ⊂ G} and p := |P |.
Claim 3. In the above setting, we have vd(Id)
∏
j∈P vaj (Iaj ) ≤
(
2
3
1
p+1
)p
1
p+1 .
Proof For an upper bound, it suffices to consider the case in which, for all j ∈ P , the density of
the clause agent aj within the auxiliary interval G is as high as possible, i.e., for all j ∈ P , we have
vaj (G) = 2/3 and, by construction, this value is constant within G.
By symmetry, we get that the product vd(Id)
∏
j∈P vaj (Iaj ) is maximized when the p clause agents
(indexed inP ) are allocated intervals of the same length, say x. Recall that the total length of the auxiliary
interval G is equal to one. Hence, under the constraint that the clause agents indexed in P are assigned
intervals of length x, we get that the length of the interval allocated to the auxiliary agent d is equal to
1− px. Since the valuation (density) of agent d is constant and equal to one within G, the value obtained
by d is equal to 1− px. Therefore,
vd(Id)
∏
j∈P
vaj (Iaj ) ≤ max
x∈[0,1]
(
2
3
x
)p
(1− px) (14)
Here, the optimal value is achieved at x∗ = 1p+1 . Therefore, the stated claim holds.
uunionsq
A.4 Proof of the bound NSWN ≤ c(α)τ
Recall that τ :=
(
12r 12r
1
3m 1
) 1
3r+m+1 and c(α) := 2−α/44. Also, from equation (12), we have
NSWN = NSW(I) ≤
(
12r
1
4t
1
2r−t
1
3m−p
(
2
3
1
p+ 1
)p 1
p+ 1
) 1
3r+m+1
(15)
Dividing by τ and considering the (3r +m+ 1)th power, we get(
NSWN
τ
)3r+m+1
≤ 3
m 2r
4t 2r−t 3m−p (p+ 1)p+1
(
2
3
)p
=
2(p−t)
(p+ 1)p+1
≤ 2
(p+ p−αm
4
)
(p+ 1)p+1
(4t+ p ≥ αm from Claim 2)
=
(
2
5p
4
(p+ 1)p+1
)
2
−αm
4
≤ 2−αm4 (16)
Here, the last inequality follows from the fact that g(x) := 2
5x
4
(x+1)x+1
is a non-increasing function of x ≥ 0
and g(0) = 1. Additionally, the inequality 2
−αm
4 ≤ 1 gives us NSWNτ ≤ 1.
Recall that in any instance of the Gap 3-SAT-5, the number of variables is at most three times the
number of clauses, r ≤ 3m. Therefore,
(
NSWN
τ
)11m
≤
(
NSWN
τ
)3r+m+1
(since NSWNτ ≤ 1 and r ≤ 3m)
≤ 2−αm4 (via (16))
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Exponentiating both sides of the previous inequality to the power 111m , we obtain the desired inequality
NSWN ≤ c(α) τ .
B Hardness of Maximizing ρ-Mean Welfare
In this section we prove that, for any fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1], it is APX-hard to find an allocation that maximizes
the ρ-mean welfare.
Recall that, in a cake-division instance 〈[n], {va}a∈[n]〉, the ρ-mean welfare of an allocation I =
{I1, . . . , In} is defined as Mρ(I) :=
(
1
n
∑n
a=1[va(Ia)]
ρ
)1/ρ. Also, as mentioned previously, the range
ρ ∈ (0, 1] constitutes a family of functions that captures both average social welfare and Nash social
welfare: ρ = 1 gives us the arithmetic mean (social welfare) and, as ρ tends to zero, the limit of Mρ is
equal to the geometric mean (the Nash social welfare).
In contrast to the APX-hardness result for maximizing Nash social welfare (Theorem 7), our reduc-
tion for ρ-mean welfare does not yield a cake-division instance with normalized valuations. That is,
here we will consider cake-division instances wherein for some agents the total value of the cake is not
necessarily equal to one. However, for the ρ = 1 case (i.e., for average social welfare), one can obtain
APX-hardness with normalized valuations–this entails a direct adaptation of the construction devel-
oped in Section 5.1.
The main result of this section is as follows
Theorem 9. For each fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1], it is APX-hard to find allocations that maximizes the ρ-mean welfare
in cake-division instances with piecewise-constant valuations. Here, the agents’ valuations are not necessarily
normalized over the cake.
Proof We prove this theorem by developing a gap-preserving reduction from Gap 3-SAT-5 to the
ρ-mean welfare maximization problem. Here, the construction of a cake-division instance (from a
Gap 3-SAT-5 instance) is quite similar to the one detailed in Section 5.1. Hence, we will primarily present
the parts where the two constructions differ and omit the commonalities.
We start with an instance of the Gap 3-SAT-5 problem, comprising of a Boolean formula φ (in con-
junctive normal form), such that—for a fixed constant α ∈ (0, 1)—it is NP-hard to distinguish between
the YES case (φ is satisfiable) and the NO case (no assignment satisfies more than (1− α) fraction of the
clauses). As before, φ comprises of a conjunction of a set of clauses, C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, defined over
Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xr}.
From formula φ, we construct a cake-division instance C(φ) which achieves the necessary gap-
property for ρ-mean welfare. We follow the construction detailed in Section 5.1 with the following
changes
1. Remove the auxiliary intervalG and the auxiliary agent d from the construction.32 Hence, the cake
[0, 14r] is obtained by concatenating the r intervals, H1, . . . ,Hr.
2. Modify the valuations (as defined in Section 5.1) for each of the remaining 3r+m agents as follows:
for an agent a and subinterval eik (in interval Hi), let va(e
i
k) be the value considered in Section 5.1,
e.g., vzi(e
i
1) = 1/4. Here, we modify va(e
i
k) ←
(
va(e
i
k)
)1/ρ, for all a ∈ [n], i ∈ [r], and k ∈ [14].
For instance, we now have vzi
(∪6k=1eik) = 241/ρ . Whenever an agent has a nonzero value for a
subinterval, we keep the valuation (density) to be constant, i.e., we ensure that the resulting cake-
division instance consists of piecewise-constant valuations.
32Here, we do not impose normalization, i.e., do not enforce each agent’s value for the entire cake to be equal to one. Hence,
in the current context, the auxiliary interval and auxiliary agent serve no purpose.
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In summary, we construct in polynomial-time a cake-division instance C(φ) with 2r separator agents,
r base agents and m clause agents; hence n = 3r + m. Observe that, with slight modifications in the
arguments, Claim 1 continues to hold for the current construction.
To prove the theorem, we first consider the YES case, i.e., the case wherein φ is satisfiable. In this
setting, there exists an assignment f : X → {0, 1} of the variables that satisfies all clauses in φ. Let MYρ
denote the optimal ρ-mean welfare in the cake-division instance C(φ). We follow a similar procedure as
discussed in Theorem 7, to obtain the following upper bound:
MYρ ≥
(
1
3r +m
[
2r + r
2ρ
4
+m
1
3
]) 1ρ
(17)
Next, we consider the NO case, i.e., under any assignment of the variables, at least αm clauses in φ
remain unsatisfied. Let I = {Ia}a be a ρ-mean optimal allocation (of C(φ)) which satisfies the properties
stated in Claim 1.
Furthermore, note that Claim 2 continues to hold in the present context with the following modifi-
cation: denote by P ′ the set of clause agents that receive a value of zero under the optimal allocation I,
i.e., P ′ := {j ∈ [m] | vaj (Iaj ) = 0}. Write p′ := |P ′|.33 The set T remains unchanged (as defined in Section
5.2), i.e., T := {i ∈ [r] | Izi = ei1 or Izi = ei8}. The arguments presented in Claim 2 gives us the inequality
4t+ p′ ≥ αm.
LetMNρ denote the optimal ρ-mean welfare in the cake-division instance C(φ), under the assumption
that φ satisfies the NO case. We once again follow a similar procedure as discussed in Theorem 7 to
obtain the following upper bound:
MNρ ≤
(
1
3r +m
[
2r + (r − t) 2
ρ
4
+ t
1
4
+ (m− p′) 1
3
+ p′ · 0
]) 1ρ
(18)
Let τ ′ :=
(
1
3r+m
[
2r + r 2
ρ
4 + m
1
3
]) 1ρ
; see equation (17). For showing that the reduction is gap pre-
serving, it suffices to bound the ratio M
N
ρ
τ ′ by a constant, say c(α, ρ). Towards this end, we analyze the
ρth power of the ratio M
N
ρ
τ ′ :
(
MNρ
τ ′
)ρ
≤ 2r + (r − t)
2ρ
4 + t
1
4 + (m− p′)13
2r + r 2
ρ
4 +m
1
3
= 1−
[ t
4(2
ρ − 1) + p′3
2r + r 2
ρ
4 +
m
3
]
≤ 1−
[ (αm−p′)
16 (2
ρ − 1) + p′3
6m+ 3m2
ρ
4 +
m
3
]
(4t+ p′ ≥ αm from Claim 2 and r ≤ 3m)
≤ 1−
[ αm
16 (2
ρ − 1) + p′(13 − 2
ρ−1
16 )
6m+ 3m2
ρ
4 +
m
3
]
≤ 1−
[ αm
16 (2
ρ − 1)
m(6 + 32
ρ
4 +
1
3)
]
(Since 13 − 2
ρ−1
16 > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, 1))
33In this construction, a clause agent can potentially receive a value of 0 even under an optimal allocation. This follows from
the observation that in the current setup there does not exist an auxiliary interval G that can be shared (as a fallback) among
the clause agents to ensure that they receive strictly positive values.
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≤ 1−
[ αm
16 (2
ρ − 1)
m(6 + 32
ρ
4 +
1
3)
]
= 1− 3α(2
ρ − 1)
4(18 + 9 2ρ + 4)
(19)
With constant c(α, ρ) :=
(
1− 3α(2ρ−1)4(18+9 2ρ+4)
)1/ρ
, inequality (19) can be restated as M
N
ρ
τ ′ ≤ c(α, ρ). Using
this bound and equation (17), we obtain a (constant) multiplicative gap of c(α, ρ) between MNρ and MYρ .
Therefore, using a (1/c(α, ρ))-approximation algorithm for the ρ-mean welfare maximization prob-
lem, one can distinguish between the YES and the NO cases of Gap 3-SAT-5. Since the latter problem is
NP-hard, such an approximation algorithm does not exist, unless P = NP. That is, we obtain (1/c(α, ρ))-
inapproximability of maximizing ρ-mean welfare (with unnormalized valuations) and, hence, the theo-
rem holds. uunionsq
C Approximating Nash Social Welfare with a Constant Number of Agents
This section shows that an α-approximate solution (with α > 1) for the Nash social welfare maximiza-
tion problem (among n agents) can be computed in time
(
n
logα
)O(n)
. In particular, for a constant number
of agents and constant α > 1, we obtain a polynomial-time α-approximation algorithm.
The high-level idea here is to first discretize the set of possible values that the agents can obtain
in a Nash optimal allocation and then find a near-optimal solution via an exhaustive search over the
discretized set.
Theorem 10. For cake-division instances
〈
[n], {va}a∈[n]
〉
, with piecewise-constant valuations, and α > 1, there
exists an algorithm that—in time
(
n
logα
)O(n)
—finds an α-approximation to the Nash social welfare maximization
problem.
Proof Let I∗ = {I∗1 , . . . , I∗n} denote a Nash optimal allocation for the given cake-division instance.
Here, interval I∗a is assigned to agent a ∈ [n]. Also, let permutation σ∗ ∈ Sn denote the order in which
the intervals I∗as are assigned across the cake [0, 1], i.e., under allocation I∗, the interval assigned to agent
σ∗(1) is at the left end of the cake and, continuing on, agent σ∗(n) receives the right-most interval.
To begin with, note that the Nash social welfare of a proportional allocation is at least 1/n and,
hence, NSW(I∗) ≥ 1/n. This implies that va(I∗a) ≥ 1nn for all agents a ∈ [n]. Therefore, for each agent
a ∈ [n], we have va(I∗a) ∈
[
1
nn , 1
]
.34 We discretize this range of values. Specifically, with α > 1, write
G :=
{
1
nn ,
α
nn ,
α2
nn ,
α3
nn , . . . , 1
}
and note that the cardinality of this set satisfies |G| ≤ n lognlogα .
Next we observe that that there necessarily exists an allocation Î = {Î1, . . . , În} which satisfies
NSW(Î) ≥ 1αNSW(I∗) and va(Îa) ∈ G for all a ∈ [n]. In particular, consider the valuation vector
(va(I
∗
a))a∈[n] and round down each component to the closest value in setG. That is, for each agent a ∈ [n],
set v̂a := max
{
αi
nn
: 0 ≤ i ≤ |G| and αinn ≤ va(I∗a)
}
. This definition ensures 1αva(I
∗
a) ≤ v̂a ≤ va(I∗a) for
each agent a ∈ [n]. Furthermore, note that following the order σ∗(1), σ∗(2), . . . , σ∗(n), we can find the
desired allocation Î, i.e., establish the existence of an allocation wherein each agent a receives an interval
of value v̂a:35 for agent σ∗(1) consider the cut point c1 ∈ [0, 1] such that vσ∗(1)[0, c1] = v̂σ∗(1). Then, we
simply repeat this procedure for the remaining agents (in order σ∗(2), . . . , σ∗(n)) and over the remaining
cake [c1, 1].
34Recall that va([0, 1]) = 1 for all a ∈ [n].
35The agent σ∗(n) can potentially receive an interval of higher value, however this corner case does not affect the developed
arguments.
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The existence of Î implies that, by enumerating over all possible valuation vectors with components
in G and all n! permutations, we can find an allocation with Nash social welfare at least 1α times the
optimal. The number of valuation vectors induced by values in G is at most |G|n, hence the time com-
plexity of this exhaustive search is O (|G|n n!). Since |G| ≤ n lognlogα , we obtain, for the Nash social welfare
maximization problem, an α-approximation algorithm that runs in time
(
n
logα
)O(n)
. uunionsq
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